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The President and the 
Constitution 
Peter L. Strauss† 
That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both 
practical advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress 
anyone who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of 
transition and public anxiety. . . . The purpose of the Constitution 
was not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of 
hand. . . . With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men 
have discovered no technique for long preserving free government 
except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be 
made by parliamentary deliberations.1 
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 In the immediate wake of the November 2014 by-elections, the New 
York Times quoted an e-mail characterizing their results as “the final 
chapter in making the president small.”2 As a political assessment, 
perhaps, but the results leave President Obama in precisely the position  
†  Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. Thanks to my 
Columbia colleagues at a faculty paper workshop and to the participants 
in this Case Western Reserve Law Review symposium for stimulating 
interventions and suggestions, and especially to Harold Bruff.  
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634, 640, 655 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
2. The whole of the quotation makes its focus on politics, not power, clear:  
  Bi-election year 2014 was the final chapter in making the 
president small. The immediate aftermath of 2008 was that Americans 
had finally conquered their racial aversions. The election of Barack 
Obama was a victory both for renewed national hope and long-awaited 
democracy. Obama was big, a star, a voice to be reckoned with, a 
mind to be taken seriously. 
  By 2014 Obama was small, a punching bag, easily bullied, the one 
to whom small politicians could talk tough, abusively, the one whose 
ideas were ignored, the one whom his fellow partisans would come to 
avoid at all cost. How could this happen in six short years? 
 Thomas B. Edsall, Op-Ed., Making the President Small, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/opinion/making-the-
president-small.html (quoting David Leege, Professor of Political Science 
Emeritus at Notre Dame University). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2014 
The President and the Constitution 
1152 
George Bush occupied following the by-election of 2006, and President 
Bush’s actions in the following two years hardly suggest presidential 
shrinkage. January 10 saw his initiation of a troop surge in Iran, 20,000 
additional American military committed to that campaign, while the 
war in Afghanistan continued unabated. Eight days later, on the day 
before the new Congress convened, he published an executive order 
amending Executive Order 12,866.3 Executive Order 12,866 is the 
executive order under which, since the Clinton administration, the 
Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) had been supervising agency analyses of 
important proposed regulations’ expected impacts, costs, and benefits.4 
President Clinton’s order had required each agency to appoint an 
internal Regulatory Policy Officer (RPO) to coordinate interactions 
with OIRA. But the agency head, not the RPO, was to take personal 
responsibility for agency rulemaking.5 The agency head appointed the 
RPO, and the order required that the RPO report to her.6 The new 
Bush amendments deleted both “report to the agency head” and the 
agency head’s need personally to approve rulemaking activity; now, 
instead, RPOs must be presidential appointees—that is, formally 
answerable to him—and “[u]nless specifically authorized by the head of 
the agency, no rulemaking shall commence nor be included on the Plan” 
without the RPO’s approval.7 The White House had effectively wrested 
control over agency rulemaking from the hands into which Congress 
had placed it.8 The following two years were marked by continuing 
perceptions that White House politics were distorting or suppressing 
regulators’ scientific judgments; in one example Professor Heidi 
 
3. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008). 
4. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). Subsequent amendments by 
the Bush administration, notably those of Exec. Order No. 13,422, were 
quickly repealed by the Obama Administration on taking office Exec. 
Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010), restoring Exec. Order No. 12,866 
to its original form. A subsequent Obama Executive Order, Exec. Order 
No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), supplemented its terms in various ways, 
addressing new forms of analysis, requiring development of plans for 
retrospective review of existing regulations, and encouraging (but not 
mandating) compliance by independent regulatory commissions. 
5. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
6. Id. 
7. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008). 
8. A markup showing Exec. Order No. 12,866 as amended by the Bush 
administration can be found in Peter L. Strauss, Todd D. Rakoff, 
Cynthia R. Farina & Gillian E. Metzger, Gellhorn & Byse’s 
Administrative Law: Cases and Comments 164–78 (rev. 10th ed. 
Supp. 2007). For a discussion of these changes and reactions to them, see 
id. at 7–9.  
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Kitrosser notes in the new book that is one subject of this essay,9 
President Bush’s OIRA suppressed greenhouse gas rulemaking, simply 
by refusing to receive the extensive scientific analysis and regulatory 
proposals the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had developed 
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.10  
Perceptions of President Bush’s politicization of administrative 
processes helped fuel President Obama’s successful first campaign. 
Restoring the integrity of government science was among his first 
promises to the American people on assuming office.11 Yet similar uses 
of White House offices to suppress regulatory efforts in the service of 
political ends marked the run-up to his reelection in 201212 and perhaps 
the 2014 by-elections as well. President Obama’s efforts to act on his 
own in the face of a dysfunctional Congress have been widely remarked 
upon,13 and he used his first press conference following the 2014 by-
elections to make clear that he expected to continue efforts to govern 
with the authority he has.14 With loss of control over the Senate as well 
as the House, the coming two years seem likely to see for him, as they 
did for Presidents Clinton and Bush, further steps toward tight political 
control of government regulatory effort. 
 
9. Heidi Kitrosser, Reclaiming Accountability: Transparency, 
Executive Power, and the U.S. Constitution 184–85 (2015) (citing 
Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 
Willamette L. Rev. 607, 608–09 (2008)). Chapter 8 of her book, as this 
article from which it was adapted, recounts numerous similar instances. 
10. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
11. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies: Scientific Integrity (Mar. 9, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memor
andum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-3-9-09/; 
see also Peter L. Strauss, Possible Controls over the Bending of Regulatory 
Science, in Values in Global Administrative Law 125 (Gordon 
Anthony et al. eds., 2011). 
12. See Curtis W. Copeland, Length of Rule Reviews by the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Admin. Conference of 
the U.S., 39–42 (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/Revised%20OIRA%20Report%20Re-posted%202-21-14.pdf. 
Other reports of political intervention by the Obama Administration have 
not been lacking. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Role of the Chief 
Executive in Administrative Action, in Global Law and 
Administrative Law 45, 49–53 (Russell Weaver & Francois Lichère 
eds., 2011); Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for 
Administrative Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 927, 956 (2014). 
13. A recent notable example is David B. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation 
of Powers, 124 Yale L.J. 2, 4–11 (2014).  
14. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference 
(Nov. 5, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/11/05/remarks-president-press-conference).  
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There are those who welcome tight presidential, political control 
over regulatory outputs, either as a necessary implication of the 
Constitution’s vesting all executive power in a singular President,15 or 
as an appropriate reaction to the exigencies of modern regulatory 
government.16 As probably is well enough known, I am not among 
them.17 Justice Jackson’s memorable concurrence in Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, drawing on personal experience, remarked as 
well as anyone could on the difficulties of extracting meaning from 
Article II’s limited text, while noting “the gap that exists between the 
President’s paper powers and his real powers. The Constitution does 
not disclose the measure of the actual controls wielded by the modern 
presidential office.”18 But Article II does not stop with the Vesting 
clause, and it does not make the President personally responsible for 
law-execution. Its only words about his relation to the executive 
Departments that Article I contemplates that Congress will create 
stand in sharp contrast to his power of “command” over the military; 
they say that he may “require the Opinion, in writing” of the heads of 
those Departments about how they anticipate exercising the Duties 
Congress has imposed on them.19 He is to take care that they faithfully 
execute the laws.20 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube, the Solicitor General’s 
argument had emphasized, as some contemporary scholars and judges 
do, the Vesting clause of Article II. Jackson’s response is worth 
recounting: 
Lest I be thought to exaggerate, I quote the interpretation which 
his brief puts upon it: “In our view, this clause constitutes a grant 
of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable.” 
If that be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered 
 
15. See, e.g., John Yoo, Crisis and Command: A History of Executive 
Power from George Washington to the Present (2011); Stephen 
Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: 
Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (2008); Stephen G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994). 
16. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 
2245 (2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994). 
17. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007). See also Robert 
Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-
So-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L.J. 963 (2001). 
18. 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952).  
19. U.S. Const., art. II, §§ 1–2.  
20. Id. at § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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to add several specific items, including some trifling ones [citing 
the Opinions, in Writing clause].  
The example of such unlimited executive power that must have 
most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by 
George III, and [their] description of its evils . . . leads me to 
doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his 
image. . . . In our own times, we can match it only from the 
executive powers in those governments we disparagingly describe 
as totalitarian. . . .21 
Having anything original to say in a paper about the President and 
the Constitution is a daunting prospect. It is in one sense a relief to be 
able to use this occasion to comment on two striking books shortly to 
be published by the University of Chicago Press. Harold Bruff’s 
Untrodden Ground: How Presidents Interpret the Constitution builds 
on his lifetime of scholarship about separation of powers, in general,22 
and the presidency in particular23—a career that got its start in 1979–
1981 when, for both President Carter and President Reagan, Bruff 
served in the President’s law office, the Department of Justice’s Office 
of Legal Counsel. Focusing particularly on presidential actions in 
relation to national security—foreign relations, military affairs, “leaks,” 
and to a lesser extent domestic disturbances—Bruff moves one at a 
time from George Washington to Barrack Obama, exploring both the 
ways in which successive Presidents have built upon the understandings 
and precedents of their predecessors (trodden ground) and the ways in 
which personality and circumstance have influenced their taking new 
 
21. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640–41 (1952).  
22. See Peter M. Shane & Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers 
Law (3d ed. 2011); Harold H. Bruff, Balance of Forces: 
Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative State (2006); 
Harold H. Bruff, The Federalist Papers: The Framers Construct an 
Orrery, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 7 (1993); Harold H. Bruff, On the 
Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 
491 (1987). 
23. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 
12 U. Pa. J. Const. Law 461 (2010); Harold H. Bruff, Bad Advice: 
Bush’s Lawyers in the War on Terror (2009); Harold H. Bruff, The 
Story of Dames & Moore: Resolution of an International Crisis by 
Executive Agreement, in Presidential Power Stories 369–400 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009); Harold H. 
Bruff, Executive Power and the Public Lands, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 503 
(2005); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 
57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533 (1989); Harold H. Bruff, Independent 
Counsel and the Constitution, 24 Willamette L. Rev. 539 (1988); 
Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 
68 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1982); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and 
Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451 (1979). 
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directions.24 By the twenty-first century, it is painful and perhaps 
unnecessary to recall, Presidents could draw on this history and its 
interstices to permit others acting under their authority to engage in 
highly questionable interrogation techniques, to support massive 
surveillance regimes, and repeatedly to thwart the exercise by 
government officials of the duties Congress had conferred not on him 
but on them—all under a blanket of secrecy whose corners were lifted 
only by “leaks” whose source their administrations often heatedly 
pursued.25 
Heidi Kitrosser’s Reclaiming Accountability: Transparency, Execu-
tive Power, and the U.S. Constitution culminates the work of a younger 
scholar whose scholarship has focused on White House secrecy and its 
implications for presidential accountability.26 Her book examines both  
24. Harold Bruff, Untrodden Ground: How Presidents Interpret 
the Constitution (2015). 
25. David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and 
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512–
635 (2013). At least for those who have not seen the President as 
Commander in Chief of domestic government from our nation’s founding 
(see supra notes 17, 18, 21) the inevitability of a rise in executive power 
under current circumstances is a dominant theme in current separation of 
power literature. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why 
Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. 
Rev. 505 (2008); Edward Cantu, The Separation of Powers and the Least 
Dangerous Branch, 13 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2015). The emphasis 
in this Article will be on secret acts built on presidential understandings 
of the Constitution, and not open ones—as, for example, President 
Obama’s publicly announced delays in implementing the Affordable Care 
Act, his publicly implemented program of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, or his conversion of an aging congressional authorization for 
military action against Al Qaeda into the basis for military actions against 
ISIS, the Islamic State—a body distinct from and opposed by Al Qaeda. 
All of these have been the subject of intense public criticism, from both 
the right (see, e.g., H.R. Res. 757, 113th Congress (Nov. 17, 2014)), and 
the left (see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Obama’s Betrayal of the Constitution, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2014, at A31). 
26. See Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: 
Calibrating First Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified 
Information, 6 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 409 (2013); Heidi Kitrosser, 
Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White House Admini-
stration, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2395 (2011); Heidi Kitrosser, What If 
Daniel Ellsberg Hadn’t Bothered?, 45 Ind. L. Rev. 89 (2011); Heidi 
Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and 
Article II Imperialism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1401 (2010); Heidi Kitrosser, 
National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 Const. Comment. 
483 (2010); Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque: Accountability, Trans-
parency, and Presidential Supremacy, 5 U. St. Thomas J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 62 (2010); Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative 
Structure, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 607 (2009); Heidi Kitrosser, The 
Accountable Executive, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1741 (2009); Heidi Kitrosser, 
Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 881 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2014 
The President and the Constitution 
1157 
the presidential supremacy arguments grounded in those asserted needs 
for secrecy and today’s arguments that the Constitution envisions a 
strong “unitary executive,” one empowered to take all executive 
decisions from the White House.27 But, she argues, power in a rule of 
law culture requires substantive accountability—ambition checking 
ambition, government actors ultimately answerable to the people. 
Originalist arguments for presidential supremacy and the strong 
unitary executive, she writes, overlook important elements of the 
framing underscoring this need. While acknowledging the changed 
circumstances of our national government and of its place in the world 
that have given these arguments such impetus, and the difficulties as 
well of effective response, she essays a careful exposition of 
counterarguments that could help to restore actual accountability of 
executive government to the people.  
There is no doubt about the changes both these books build on, as 
many have noted before me. From a normative perspective, in my 
judgment, Professor Kitrosser puts the contemporary challenge just 
right. From a descriptive perspective, reflecting the exigencies of the 
day and President Clinton’s own struggles with Congress, then Pro-
fessor, now Justice, Elena Kagan put it well in her influential essay 
“Presidential Administration”:  
[A] line [between oversight and command] remains, and by so 
often asserting legal authority to direct regulatory decisions, 
President Clinton crossed from one side of it to the other. . . . 
[T]he explicit and repeated assertion of directive authority 
probably alters over time . . . the ‘psychology of government’—
the understanding of agency and White House officials alike of 
their respective roles and powers. This change, in turn, makes 
presidential intervention in regulatory matters ever more routine 
and agency acceptance of this intervention ever more ready . . . a 
significant enhancement of presidential power . . . .28  
The second President Bush and President Obama have taken the 
presidency still farther from this line. The concern for me, again from 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube but now in the words of Justice Frankfurter, 
is this:  
 
(2008); Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security 
Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1049 
(2008); Heidi Kitrosser, “Macro-Transparency” as Structural Directive: 
A Look at the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1163 
(2007); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive 
Privilege Revisited, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 489 (2007). 
27. Kitrosser. 
28. Kagan, supra note 16, at 2298–99. 
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The Founders of this Nation . . . rested the structure of our 
central government on the system of checks and balances. . . . 
These long-headed statesmen had no illusion that our people 
enjoyed biological or psychological or sociological immunities 
from the hazards of concentrated power. . . . The accretion of 
dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however 
slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the 
restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of 
authority.29 
What Professor Bruff has written helps us to understand how we got 
here. Professor Kitrosser demonstrates both the difficulties and the 
importance of working our way free. 
I. The Unmediated and Mediated Presidencies 
Professor Bruff’s endeavor is a remarkable, ambitious undertak-
ing—a valuable supplement to Stephen Skowronek’s canonical The 
Politics Presidents Make,30 to which he often refers. Skowronek also 
recounted presidential changes through history, but with different ends 
in view, considering four successive sets of three Presidents each, in the 
service of recurrent patterns he discerned as a repeating political cycle, 
the ebb and flow of our politics from the establishment of a new pattern 
by a strong figure31 through its articulation by intermediaries32 to its 
ultimate disjunction by a less successful figure.33 Professor Bruff 
considers the constitutional vision of all our Presidents, one by one, and 
with less of a felt need to construct a theoretical framework. Inevitably, 
we see them through his eyes, and he does not hesitate to share his 
judgments with us. Some are presented as heroes (Lincoln, 
unsurprisingly, is in his view our greatest President); other judgments 
are harsher: “same mean spirit,” “dissimulation,” “failed his duty in 
this regard,” “unseemly vindictiveness.” “Harding revealed his own 
level of acuity by saying that ‘if Albert Fall isn’t an honest man, I am 
not fit to be President.’ Both were true.”34 The writing is informal; this 
makes for an enjoyable as well as an educational read; one comes away 
with the feeling of having met our Presidents as human beings—no 
small accomplishment. 
 
29. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1952). 
30. Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership 
from John Adams to George Bush (1993). 
31. Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. 
32. James Monroe, James K. Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson. 
33. John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, Herbert Hoover, and Jimmy Carter. 
34. Bruff at 224. 
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Professor Bruff’s fundamental premise is that, at the end of the 
day, Presidents rely on their own constitutional views, influenced but 
not driven by what their office has become before they come to it, and 
by the advice they get from advisers, many of whom we also meet. 
Thus, the project is to see the Constitution through each President’s 
eyes, as an individual (and profoundly influential) reader of our 
founding document. Unsurprisingly, some warrant more attention than 
others. Each of fourteen chapters has a focal President, and in all but 
the last two (George W. Bush and Barack Obama), they are preceded 
and/or followed by others of the forty-four. Each has a personality; 
each acts within the politics and circumstances of his time, facing 
particular challenges from which the character of his presidency 
emerges and by which the ground for his successors’ actions may be 
laid. Bruff wants us to see not cyclical patterns but change and, over 
time, growth, as history and technology have brought us from tentative 
beginnings at the margin of the developed world to status as a military 
and economic superpower, without even the slightest alteration of the 
few words by which the Constitution describes the President’s 
authority and place in government. And, as his abstract for the book 
remarks, his conclusion is an optimistic one: “Overall, the presidential 
office in the hands of its occupants has evolved in ways that seem 
sufficient to protect both the nation and the rule of law,”35 albeit one 
conditioned as Professor Kitrosser’s analysis persuasively urges, on the 
continued viability of presidential accountability to Congress and the 
public.36 
Bruff focuses the bulk of his attention on foreign relations, military 
affairs, and the protection of “state secrets.” In these settings, we expect 
relatively little of law and have understood from the outset that other 
government actors are presidential alter egos, expressing or taking 
actions that reflect his views and decisions. The operative checks are 
political, with, as Marbury v. Madison early expressed, few if any 
possibilities of judicial review: 
[The Secretary of State, in administering foreign affairs,] is to 
conform precisely to the will of the President. He is the mere 
organ by whom that will is communicated. The act of such an 
officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts. But 
 
35. Harold Bruff, Untrodden Ground: How Presidents Interpret 
the Constitution (Nov. 6, 2014) (unpublished abstract) (on file with 
Case Western Reserve Law Review). 
36. “Even in ordinary times, our system has recently become similar enough 
to a permanent constitutional dictatorship to give deep pause. A massive 
and secret national security bureaucracy supports secret presidential 
decisions to use force or spy on the world, with only loose controls in 
congressional or judicial oversight and little public knowledge. The 
primary constitutional challenge for our time is to construct ways to 
respond to this development.” Bruff at 465–66.  
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when the legislature proceeds to [direct] . . . that officer . . . per-
emptorily to perform certain acts [on which individual rights turn] 
. . . he is so far the officer of the law . . . and cannot at his 
discretion sport away the rights of others. 
. . . [W]here the heads of departments are . . . to act in cases in 
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, 
nothing can be more perfectly clear, than that their acts are only 
politically examinable. . . . 
. . . The province of the courts is, solely, to decide on the rights 
of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive 
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Ques-
tions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution 
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this 
court.37 
Presidential–congressional struggles over this unmediated,38 first 
actor presidency—over foreign policy and the use of America’s military, 
with their associated considerations of national security—are at the 
heart of the President’s consideration of the Constitution’s meaning in 
authorizing, and constraining, his exercise of office. It can be no surprise 
that issues of transparency and honesty in those struggles, and the 
continuing accretion of presidential initiative respecting them, are at 
the center of Professor Bruff’s analysis. Elaine Scarry, less optimistic 
than he,39 has recently inveighed against our Thermonuclear Monarchy: 
Choosing Between Democracy and Doom, concerned at the effect on 
our politics of one actor’s unilateral control over an arsenal that is in 
itself sufficient to produce global destruction.40 Nonetheless, the very 
fact of this responsibility and other actors’ alter ego status warrants 
the personal focus Bruff’s account brings. For this very reason, as he 
remarks, Presidents concentrate on controlling the constitutional 
cabinet. And here Bruff’s account is detailed, richly describing events 
and introducing many of the actors involved, with both their virtues 
(e.g., Attorney General Robert Jackson, General Ulysses S. Grant) and 
their faults (e.g., Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, Colonel 
Oliver North). Successes and failures of congressional checking and/or 
ratification are similarly treated, whether Lincoln’s dealings with 
Congress anticipating and during the Civil War, the Gulf of Tonkin  
37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166, 169–70 (1803). 
38. Thanks to Professor Bruff for suggesting this characterization as we cor-
responded during the development of this Article. 
39. Professor Bruff’s book concludes “not in fear, but in hope. . . . A 
president’s highest attainment is, like Lincoln’s, to transcend ordinary 
politics and to set the United States on a better course. Toward that 
horizon there always lies untrodden ground.” Bruff at 608–09. 
40. Elaine Scarry, Thermonuclear Monarchy, Choosing Between 
Democracy and Doom (2014). 
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Resolution, or the War Powers Resolution that soon followed. 
Presidential maneuvering to maintain the appearance of compliance 
with the War Powers Resolution while testing its practical limits is a 
constant subject for the years following its adoption at the beginning 
of President Nixon’s abbreviated second term in office. 
Yet there is also a mediated presidency, the world of domestic regu-
lation that is the principal focus of Professor Kitrosser’s book. For many 
scholars of administrative law, including the author, the mediated 
presidency—domestic regulation and in particular the President’s 
relation to agency rulemaking—has raised pressing questions not just 
of discretion’s exercise, but also of law.41 In the mediated presidency, 
government officials are not simply the mouthpiece of the President, 
conveying or carrying out his policy preferences. They are themselves 
the possessors of legislatively created “duties” requiring their exercise 
of significant elements of judgment.42 It could be thought significant, in 
 
41. Over half a century ago, in his treatment of the American presidency, 
Edwin Corwin stated the dilemma of characterizing presidential power in 
a passage I find hard to improve on:  
  Suppose . . . that the law casts a duty upon a subordinate 
executive agency eo nomine, does the President thereupon 
become entitled, by virtue of his “executive power” or of his duty 
to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” to substitute 
his judgment for that of the agency regarding the discharge of 
such duty? An unqualified answer to this question would invite 
startling results. An affirmative answer would make all questions 
of law enforcement questions of discretion, the discretion 
moreover of an independent and legally uncontrollable branch of 
the government. By the same token, it would render it impossible 
for Congress, notwithstanding its broad powers under the 
“necessary and proper” clause, to leave anything to the specially 
trained judgment of a subordinate executive official with any 
assurance that his discretion would not be perverted to political 
ends for the advantage of the administration in power. At the 
same time, a flatly negative answer would hold out consequences 
equally unwelcome. It would, as Attorney General Cushing 
quaintly phrased it, leave it open to Congress so to divide and 
transfer “the executive power” by statute as to change the 
government “into a parliamentary despotism like that of 
Venezuela or Great Britain with a nominal executive chief or 
president, who, however, would remain without a shred of actual 
power. 
Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 80–81 (4th 
ed. 1957). 
42. As Attorney General William Wirt remarked in an opinion preserved in 
the first volume of Opinions of the Attorney General, “ If the laws, then, 
require a particular officer by name to perform a duty, not only is that 
officer bound to perform it, but no other officer can perform it without a 
violation of the law; and were the President to perform it, he would not 
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this respect, that the Opinion in Writing Clause, the Constitution’s sole 
statement about their relationship to the President, specifies a writing, 
not a conversation. An opinion delivered in writing is one that may be 
seen by others, as (absent recording)43 private conversations cannot be, 
potentially answering Professor Kitrosser’s accountability concerns. 
And for the decisions of the mediated presidency, it is not so that 
“[q]uestions . . . which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to 
the executive, can never be made in this court.”44 Rather, the ability of 
citizens to obtain judicial review to assess the legality of actions 
adversely affecting them appears to be the very coin by which the 
legislative creation of those duties must be purchased. As Judge Harold 
Leventhal once trenchantly remarked, “Congress has been willing to 
delegate its legislative powers broadly—and courts have upheld such 
delegations—because there is court review . . . .”45  
In this context, Professor Bruff’s optimism about the survival of 
“the rule of law” faces sterner challenges. “From the outset,” Bruff 
writes, “President Nixon intended to focus his efforts on foreign policy. 
Domestic policy, he thought, was about ‘building outhouses in 
Peoria.’”46 Yet Nixon’s focus on the issues of the unmediated presidency 
was not exclusive. The emergence of rulemaking with high industrial 
stakes captured his attention, as it has captured his successors’. The 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had for the first time 
developed a rulemaking proposal that eventually would lead to having 
airbags in American automobiles; thousands of deaths annually were 
on the line. GM had the technology. Ford sought a presidential 
audience—fortuitously recorded—to urge the President to stop or at 
least delay a rulemaking advantageous to its commercial rival. 
President Nixon had John Ehrlichman call Secretary of Transportation 
John Volpe to pass on his wish that the rule, at least, be significantly 
delayed. Volpe’s response? I’ll ask my lawyer; “I am trying to do a job 
over here.”47 While the rule went forward, and Volpe kept his job, the 
conversation evokes the current day when, as already remarked, dozens 
of rulemaking proposals are stopped at the White House door, or 
delayed past promised action in the White House, in the service of 
simply political ends.  
 
only be not taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he 
would be violating them himself.” 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625 (1823). 
43. See infra text accompanying note 72. 
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169–70 (1803). 
45. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., 
concurring). 
46. Bruff at 327. 
47. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Edward L. Rubin, & Kevin M. Stack, 
The Regulatory State 779 (2010). 
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The problem in the domestic regulatory context is one for which an 
eighteenth-century document, looked at through the President’s 
personal eyes, cannot possibly supply “original intent” answers; today’s 
mediated presidency is not, and cannot possibly be, unitary in any 
personal sense. Here, it seems appropriate to consider several linked 
developments since Justice Jackson’s formative experience—outside the 
unmediated presidency and thus largely unaddressed in Bruff’s work—
that have contributed to changed expectations about the presidency in 
the last half-century, from an office dependent for success on persuasion 
of the bureaucracy it oversees,48 to an office responsible for and capable 
of control. The Executive Office of the Presidency has grown from a 
handful of officials tolerated by Congress on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
promise that they would merely advise him, to hundreds of bureaucrats 
acting as intermediaries between President and agency, with “czars” 
responsible for major policy concerns acting outside public 
administrative procedures and shielded by White House prerogatives 
from public view. Many actors are able to claim to speak for the 
President without being the President,49 and that is a bluff hard to call. 
In the agencies themselves, the increasing politicization of positions and 
the practical effects of creating the Senior Executive Service (during 
the Carter administration) have increased political control over high-
level bureaucrats, undermining the civil service system and civil service 
expectations.50 Beginning in President Nixon’s administration, 
rulemaking under new national health, safety, and environmental 
statutes augured major economic impacts and brought in its train 
presidential regimes of increasing control. And, finally, the dawn of the 
Information Age has diminished, if not virtually eliminated, any agency 
advantage in its dealings with the White House that might come from 
superior access to information. A desktop computer tied to the 
government side of the new federal data management system can 
instantly bring to White House desks the full range of information 
known to an agency. If knowledge and information are power, the 
instant and independent availability of all this data on White House 
computer screens has effected a significant transfer of power to White 
 
48. When contemplating General Eisenhower winning the presidential 
election, Truman said, “He’ll sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ 
And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll 
find it very frustrating.” Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: 
The Politics of Leadership 22 (1964).  
49. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenberg, Inside the Administra-
tive State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 
Mich. L. Rev. 47 (2006). 
50. David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative 
Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 
1126 (2008). 
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House overseers—power that is, again, outside public administrative 
procedures and shielded by White House prerogatives from public view.  
Here lie the challenges to Bruff’s optimistic view that “the presi-
dential office in the hands of its occupants has evolved in ways that 
seem sufficient to protect . . . the rule of law.”51 Bruff uses as the epi-
gram for his Nixon-Ford chapter Nixon’s remarkable statement in a 
1977 interview with David Frost: “Well, when the president does it, 
that means it is not illegal . . . the president’s decision . . . is one that 
enables those who carry it out, to carry it out without violating a law.”52 
As Joseph Kraft wrote then about Watergate in The Washington Post, 
“The president and his campaign manager have set a tone that 
positively encourages dirty work by low-level operators.”53 In 2014 a 
New York Times columnist used Nixon’s infamous remark as a means 
of characterizing the 2012 Obama directive on Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals, which (after the failure of The Dream Act, a 
legislative initiative of similar import) opened the door to work permits, 
social security numbers, and in many states drivers’ licenses to millions 
of illegal childhood immigrants who could not otherwise have acquired 
them.54 Professor Lisa Heinzerling has written corrosively about the 
manner in which politics carrying White House fingerprints derailed the 
Food and Drug Administration’s scientific judgments about the safety 
of emergency contraceptives in both the Bush and Obama 
administrations.55 And the meticulous work of a former Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) analyst has produced unmistakable evidence of political ob-
struction by the White House during 2011–2012 of numerous important 
health and safety regulatory initiatives.56 
 
51. Bruff, supra note 35. 
52. Bruff at 325. 
53. Robert Dallek, Legacy Tarnished by His Own Words, N.Y. Times (July 
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/books/in-the-nixon-def 
ense-john-w-dean-returns-to-watergate.html?_r=0.  
54. When the President Does It, That Means . . ., N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2014), 
http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/when-the-president-does-
it-that-means/. 
55. Heinzerling, supra note 12. 
56. Copeland, supra note 12, at 6–7; Administrative Conference of the 
United States, Statement #18: Improving the Timeliness of 
OIRA Regulatory Review 2 (2013), available at https://www.acus. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/OIRA%20Statement%20FINAL%20P
OSTED%2012-9-13.pdf. 
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II. Obstacles to Reclaiming Accountability 
Let us turn, then, to the problem that so concerns Professor 
Kitrosser—finding effective means of assuring presidential account-
ability, with a focus on the mediated presidency. Those of us concerned 
with the steady and apparently irresistible growth of presidential 
administration will find in Reclaiming Accountability a thoughtful 
response to the overstatements of the constitutional arguments claimed 
to support it that seem never to read Article II past its Vesting clause, 
and a careful exposition of counterarguments that could help to curb 
it. She understands the supremacists and unitarians well, and her 
analysis of the flaws in their argument is thoroughly grounded in 
original understandings. Rich with detail and examples, she shows how 
the arguments for presidential accountability, well grounded in our 
Constitution, support neither presidential supremacy nor the stronger 
forms of argument for a unitary executive, but rather a presidency in 
which executive secrecy and command are contained by law. The laws 
whose faithful execution the President is obliged to assure assign duties 
to others than himself, and unless he is the absolute monarch the 
authors of our Constitution clearly rejected, those assignments must be 
a part of the law for the faithful execution of which he is responsible.57  
Central to Kitrosser’s concern is the secret curtain behind which 
the White House often acts, whose cloak over its influence is the 
obstacle to accountability. The controls OMB exercises over legislative 
requests, legislative testimony, reports, and speeches often figure in her 
analyses. Yet it is the emergence of agency rulemaking with high 
industrial stakes and in the hands of executive departments, relatively 
late in the growth of the regulatory state, that has brought so 
prominently into view questions of the President’s relation to domestic 
regulation and his accountability for his influence over it.  
As recently as the middle of the twentieth century, when federal 
regulation had blossomed and the Administrative Procedure Act was 
adopted, regulation was dominantly effected by adjudication. It may 
have been that dominance that permitted Chief Justice, formerly Pres-
ident, Taft to breeze past the possible distinction between the unmed-
iated and mediated presidencies in Myers v. United States,58 the 
foundation-stone of so many “unitary executive” arguments.59 He was 
 
57. Attorney General William Wirt, supra note 42. 
58. 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 
59. The opinion’s excessive breadth is clear. Chief Justice Taft had only to 
conclude that the Senate could not reserve for itself a right of partic-
ipation in removals from office on analogy to its participation in appoint-
ments, a proposition having no necessary implication for the nature of the 
relationship between the President and government officers. The 
Constitution provides for appointments when Congress is not sitting—as 
until the 20th Amendment it very often would not be; it says nothing 
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careful to remark in his opinion that in adjudication, presidential 
control over decision-makers was constrained. The case presented no 
occasion to think about agency rulemaking. And it has been in the 
context of rulemaking, in debates over its oversight/control by the 
presidential Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs pursuant to 
the presidential initiatives that first emerged in the Nixon 
administration, that argumentation respecting the mediated presidency 
has gained significant prominence.  
President Nixon’s successors have fashioned rulemaking supervision 
(and possibly, although not overtly, control) regimes of steadily 
increasing breadth and rigor. They have involved themselves in 
particular rulemakings of political significance to them as well. One 
readily sees beneath the surface of these developments, as Professor 
Kagan quite persuasively detailed,60 a presidential view of constitutional 
authority that has shifted strongly into “first actor, unmediated” mode. 
And one as readily sees the possibility, and in some cases the 
demonstrable fact, of the use of that authority for political ends outside 
the duties and responsibilities Congress has created for executive 
branch actors—uses, that is, outside “the law.”  
Consider as an early example EPA’s effort to combat acid rain by 
controlling the sulfur emissions of coal-fired power plants, a rulemaking 
completed in the Carter administration. The rule was promulgated only 
after numerous conversations with the White House and with Senate 
Majority Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia, a state whose economy 
was threatened by what would have been the least costly approach for 
the utilities, requiring their use of abundant, low-sulfur western coal. 
The Washington Post reported that a more costly requirement to use 
scrubbers that would permit the continued use of West Virginia coal 
was a price Senator Byrd insisted be paid for his support for other 
matters important to the President, a report that found credence in a 
noteworthy scholarly book written in its immediate aftermath.61 For 
the D.C. Circuit, reviewing the rule, the newspaper report was not 
enough to prompt a judicial inquiry into possible impropriety, and the 
White House meetings did not matter, so long as not used as a 
 
about removals. The proposition that the Founders contemplated 
requiring the President to await Congress’s December reconvening (and 
then debate and action) before effecting the removal of any principal 
officer defies belief. Given the text’s reasonable care in providing for recess 
appointments, surely it would have said something about recess removals, 
had the Founders imagined a requirement of senatorial acquiescence in 
removals when Congress was in session. See id. 
60. Kagan, supra note 16, at 2266. 
61. Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty 
Air (1981). 
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“conduit” for industry-supplied views or information.62 The reviewing 
court repulsed any suggestion that meetings with the President were 
improper or could be conditioned on their transparency, noting that 
Congress had required only that written comments be made a part of 
the rulemaking record, that a presidential role was both desirable (to 
avoid agency tunnel vision) and constitutionally required, and that the 
possibility that “undisclosed Presidential prodding” produced a 
sustainable outcome, but one different from that which would have 
been reached without it, was irrelevant to its review function. It gave 
90 percent of an opinion running 100 pages in F.2d63 over to an 
examination in excruciating detail of the agency’s extensive opinion, in 
light of its voluminous record—but that examination established only 
that the agency’s conclusion might have been reached by the application 
of its judgment to the facts before it under the statute creating its 
authority, not that it had been.64  
Early on in her work,65 Professor Kitrosser remarks how unlikely 
judicial indifference to “prodding” is to change. Supreme Court justices 
owe their place to presidential appointment, and Presidents may not 
be indifferent to their views about presidential authority. They are not 
immune to “presidential mystique,” and institutionally are committed 
to casting shadows on their coordinate branches. That courts would not 
be concerned whether determinative prodding has occurred doubtless 
encouraged the prodding. To be sure, the wording of the Reagan 
administration’s executive order on rulemaking review, E.O. 12,291, 
rather strongly respected agency autonomy and promised essential 
transparency about its exercise. More cautiously than its successors, 
this order was carefully framed in terms of the Constitution’s “Opinion, 
in writing” clause. Throughout, it acknowledged that substantive 
responsibility remained in the agency; it required agencies to submit 
draft and final analyses of major rules to the Director, to consult with 
him about them, and, unless under a statutory of judicial order to act 
earlier,66 to “refrain from publishing [that analysis and the proposal or 
rule to which it related] until the agency has responded to the Director’s 
views, and incorporated those views and the agency’s response in the 
 
62. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 n.520 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
63. Id. at 311–410.  
64. Lisa Heinzerling, Classical Administrative Law in the Era of Presidential 
Administration, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 171, 173 (2014) (responding to Daniel 
Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 
92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137 (2014)). For Professor Heinzerling, Sierra Club v. 
Costle exemplifies the failure of “classical administrative law” to respond 
to the intrusion of raw politics into its processes. Id. 
65. Kitrosser at 7. 
66. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).  
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rulemaking file.”67 Ostensibly, then, correspondence between agency 
and OMB would be open, and the agency would have the final word. 
Followed, these provisions honored agency duty and would have 
provided useful transparency to Congress and the public.  
Professor Bruff, in his thoughtful analysis of “Presidential 
Management of Agency Rulemaking,”68 described administration during 
the Reagan administration as a process of negotiation with tradeoffs 
only “at the margin” (given the agency’s “massive advantage in the size 
and expertise of its staff”);69 he found controversy rising gradually 
through the bureaucratic hierarchy on both sides. “[T]he ultimate steps 
of appealing to the presidential level or issuing a rule over OMB’s 
objections are rare.”70 Three things to note here: first, that the order 
explicitly acknowledged the superior force of statutory or judicial 
deadlines; second, that a rule could be issued over OMB’s objections, 
however rarely; and finally, and perhaps more importantly, that its 
tasks were framed in the era of paper records. Rulemaking documents 
came in limited numbers of copies and lived in agency files, from which 
the White House could only acquire them openly from the agency and 
with relative difficulty.  
Subsequent administrations, however, have adopted regimes for 
influencing rulemaking that would “leave no fingerprints”71 or have 
simply failed to follow through on Executive Order promises that 
timetables for review would be respected and that changes review 
brought about would be placed in the public record.72 The strongest 
arguments for a unitary executive respecting the mediated presidency—
a President able to decide controversial matters Congress has assigned 
to agencies—have taken hold with the emergence of the information 
age, during the quarter century since Professor Bruff wrote about 
presidential administration under E.O. 12,291. With its emergence, as 
 
67. Id. (emphasis added). 
68. Bruff, Presidential Management, supra note 23, at 560. This article, still 
an important element of the administrative law lexicon, is one of his few 
writings on the presidency Professor Bruff does not cite in his book. 
69.  Id.  
70.  Id. at 561–62. 
71. E.g., Michael Arndt, Democrats Target Quayle’s Regulations Panel, 
Chicago Tribune (Sept. 6, 1992), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/ 
1992-09-06/news/9203210202_1_democrats-council-president-bush. 
72. Writing in 2010, Professor Nina Mendelson reported finding only forty-
two explanations by the Bush administration of the several hundred 
economically significant rules modified after OIRA’s consideration, and 
no explanation of any kind during the first year of the Obama 
administration of the 90 percent of the rules modified or withdrawn 
following consultation. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” 
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1150 
(2010). Surveying subsequent years, Professor Kitrosser found no change. 
See Copeland, supra note 12, at 7. 
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has not been much noted in the literature, the growing breadth and use 
of computer data sources has eliminated much of agencies’ former 
informational advantage. A government-wide database, Regulations. 
gov, is now in place to house all rulemaking data in a readily searchable 
electronic format. For the public, this is transformative; anyone wishing 
to see the agency’s public data including all comments previously files 
has it on her desktop, permitting a level of analysis and commentary 
never before possible. And there are additional elements of the database 
accessible only within government that further expand the visibility of 
the process. Few now believe, as Professor Bruff found in his early 
analysis, that White House rulemaking review remains a process 
dominated by agency responsibility and expertise, with tradeoffs only 
“at the margins.” 
Professor Kitrosser flags the transparency in mediated relationships 
that one could so readily find implicit in the “Opinion, in writing” 
clause of Article II, as essential to restoring the President’s substantial 
accountability to the people. In this respect, she makes common cause 
with an important group of administrative law scholars, mostly women, 
who have been stressing both the present failures of transparency and 
the need for political influence to be openly exercised.73 Looking at the 
dealings between Congress and the White House that produced, first, a 
presidentially managed budget74 and then, about two decades later, the  
73. Professor Heinzerling strongly criticizes the Sierra Club opinion for its 
tolerance of covert presidential intervention. Heinzerling, supra note 12, 
at 982–86. Compare Farber & O’Connell, supra note 64. Nina A. 
Mendelson, supra note 72. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for 
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2 (2009); 
Schultz Bressman & Vandenburgh, supra note 49. 
74. Professor Kitrosser understands the creation of the Bureau of the Budget 
under presidential supervision as an element of the growth of presidential 
authority, at 173 ff., but might have added that Congress simultaneously 
created the GAO as an arm of capable of supervising the expenditures 
thus centrally authorized. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. 
No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20. Those outside government tend not to know, as 
government bureaucrats do, that GAO houses staff inside every 
government agency, with a roving warrant to oversee its activities and 
report back on them to Congress—penetration into the bureaucracy in 
the service of its mandate to monitor budget implementation that has 
often produced “transparency” insights into executive branch actions 
otherwise unlikely to have been achieved. Professor Bruff points out (also 
without mentioning the GAO) that the BoB was created during the 
presidency of Warren Harding, “[a] weak man [who] did not favor a strong 
presidency and could not have conducted one.” “[A]t long last,” he writes, 
“Congress provided authority for the executive branch to form a federal 
budget, ending the longstanding practice of separate and uncoordinated 
submission of departmental requests and laying the basis for greater 
presidential control of the executive.” Bruff at 286. If one can see the 
President’s acquiescence in the simultaneous creation of GAO as a bargain 
to balance greater presidential control with more effective congressional 
oversight, the irony of this happening during a “weak” presidency 
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EOP75—indeed, at the manner in which President Reagan, to secure 
congressional acceptance, couched his Executive Order 12,29176—one is 
struck by how the White House acknowledged this need. Might one 
now think that, with the 2014 by-election’s results, we will see 
legislation giving statutory form to the Executive Orders and, in doing 
so, requiring and making enforceable the transparency they have long 
promised? The executive order may be clear in stating that it creates 
no rights of judicial enforcement, but a statute need not take the same 
position. And the Republican Congress may be strongly motivated to 
expose the tight control presidential offices, rarely the President 
himself, now exercise over rulemaking outcomes. 
Yet a complicating tension exists between our reliance on “trans-
parency” to induce responsibility and arm oversight, and our under-
standing that transparency chills candor. President Truman once wrote 
that “[t[he President cannot function without Advisers or without 
advice, written or oral. But just as soon as he is required to show what 
kind of advice he has had, who said what to him, or what kind of 
records he has, the advice received will be worthless.”77 Congress to 
date has recognized the White House’s high stakes in the confidentiality 
of internal discussions of policy issues, at least so far as citizen access 
is concerned.78 Interpretations of the federal Freedom of Information 
Act reflect this proposition in two ways—the President and his personal 
advisors are not classified among the “agencies” subject to its 
 
disappears. The Commission recommending creation of the BoB, as 
Professor Kitrosser recounts, stressed that “every plan to be executed be 
made an open book.” Kitrosser at 176. 
75. The recommendations of the Brownlow Commission, leading to the initial 
creation of the EOP, remarked as well “the necessity of improving the 
machinery of holding the Executive Branch more effectively accountable 
to the Congress.” Heidi Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity, supra note 26, at 
2402. 
76. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).  
77. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope 454 (1956). 
78. There have been repeated battles between Congress and the White House 
over executive privilege claims respecting information demands from the 
Congress itself, most often (and best) resolved by negotiation. What is 
now the Government Accountability Office (formerly the General 
Accounting Office) was created at the same time as the Bureau of the 
Budget, as a congressional agency of investigation with continuous access 
to agency files, and its findings have sometimes created the possibility of 
accountability—underlying, for example, Professor Heinzerling’s acerbic 
critique of the Plan B Fiasco. Heinzerling, supra note 12. 
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commands;79 and the Act’s exemption for “pre-decisional” documents80 
has long and properly been understood to protect the confidentiality of 
policy advice. And if one needed confirmation of the wisdom of this 
exemption, one needs look only to the impact of a law from which such 
an exemption has been omitted—the federal Government in the 
Sunshine Act.81 This act, applicable only to multimember commissions 
like the FCC, requires the commissions to meet in public, on a week’s 
advice notice, on all matters save those subject to its limited 
exemptions, and there is no exemption for discussions leading up to 
decision. A commission’s discussion of the budget request it will make 
to OMB and/or the Congress for the coming year, if oral and collective, 
must be held in public. So too must discussions of rulemaking proposals 
and other often sensitive policy matters. The consequence of the Act 
has been to lead agencies away from collegial discussion. Decisions are 
developed and taken by circulating memoranda, by notational voting, 
and other means that will avoid the necessity of an open meeting.82 
Staff acquire effective political power that commissioners lose. 
Might one somehow distinguish, respecting the implementation of 
the executive order, between the requirement of annually developing a 
regulatory plan for the coming year, Section 4 of the order, and the 
regulatory impact analyses required of individual significant proposed 
rulemakings, Section 6? The regulatory plan of Section 4 is at the heart 
of the President’s claims on the mediated presidency, providing an 
annual chance (like the fiscal budget) to allocate priorities for the year 
and address actions that involve coordination of several agencies. The 
 
79. Although 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) defines “agency” as “each authority of the 
Government” with exclusions that do not mention the President or the 
EOP, and 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) provides that for FOIA purposes “agency” 
includes “any . . . establishment in the executive branch of the 
Government (including the Executive Office of the Presidency),” 
emphases added, courts solicitous of presidential confidentiality claims 
have interpreted “authority” and “establishment” to embrace only 
statutorily defined bodies such as OMB, and not the President himself or 
individuals acting for him. Judicial Watch v. United States Secret Service, 
726 F.3d 208 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). 
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012). 
82. See, for example, the letter sent by the FCC to the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, Feb. 2, 2005, reproduced in 
Peter L. Strauss, Todd D. Rakoff, Cynthia R. Farina & Gillian 
E. Metzger, Gellhorn & Byse’s Administrative Law: Cases and 
Comments 518 (11th ed. 2011), and the practices revealed in Reeve T. 
Bull, Administrative Conference of the United States, The 
Government in the Sunshine Act in the 21st Century (2014), 
available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Government%20in%20the%20Sunshine%20Act%20Draft%20Report%20
REVISED%205-7-14.pdf. 
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recent emergence of well-publicized presidential directives—the events 
that then-Professor Kagan once celebrated83—are individual instances 
of such guidance and, like the plan itself, their transparency fits well 
the desire for accountability. But as administered, if not promised, 
Section 6 actions frustrate it. The failures to honor its promises of 
transparency deflects accountability; the possibility of redirecting 
particular outcomes that agencies would prefer, as appears to occur, 
offends what President Reagan’s executive order was careful to 
recognize:84 Congress’s placement of the duty of rulemaking not in the 
President but in the agency. And that OIRA is subject to FOIA opens 
at least some possibilities for required disclosure. While predecisional 
documents may be withheld, agencies are under a statutory obligation 
to disclose “any reasonably segregable portion of a record”; assertions 
of fact, corrections of technique, and similar elements possible—and 
believed to be elements of—OIRA’s communications to agencies are not 
policy advice (though they may form the foundation for it), and so 
would not fall within the “predecisional” exemption. The particularistic 
argumentation about the adequacy of analysis in an agency draft that 
marks dialog between agency staff and OIRA desk officers is a far cry 
from the policy advice President Truman insisted must be 
confidentially supplied to him personally;85 its public availability seems 
more likely to enhance than to lessen its worth. 
Which, of course, would leave the telephone and other evanescent 
means of conversation. So much depends, as I have earlier written,86 on 
the psychology of office—on the way in which government actors regard 
and hold their responsibilities and their relationships with others. 
“With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered 
no technique for long preserving free government except that the 
Executive be under the law . . . .”87 But then the President and those 
who share high executive office with him must so regard themselves.  
Conclusion 
The presidency exemplifies a tension that animates all of admini-
strative law, between the worlds of law and politics. The aspiration to 
a “government of laws and not of men” is impossible of realization at 
even the most basic of levels, individual bureaucrats, since “men” will 
always be a part of government, and discretion can never be entirely 
 
83. See generally, Kagan, supra note 16.  
84. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
85. Judicial Watch v. United States Secret Service, 726 F.3d 208, 224 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013). 
86. The President and Accounting Offices, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 624 (1823). 
87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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subdued. The issue, rather, is assuring that we have a government of 
laws as well as “men”—that politics occurs within a framework 
respectful of legal constraint, that we are able to preserve what Peter 
Shane has wisely described as a “rule of law culture.”88 And that, in 
turn, demands that—again in Shane’s words—“the written documents 
of law must be buttressed by a set of norms, conventional expectations, 
and routine behaviors that lead officials to behave as if they are 
accountable to the public interest and to legitimate sources of legal and 
political authority.”89 There must be, that is, a psychology of office 
promoting the personal responsibility of those in whom Congress has 
created duties of administration—a psychology that might be reinforced 
both by the discipline of judicial oversight and by the possibilities of 
political oversight not just from the White House, but also from 
Congress and ultimately from the people, yet a psychology that 
ultimately will depend on personal understanding of the nature of one’s 
position. The servant acts in a different mindset than the independent 
contractor, the soldier than an attorney.  
 
 
 
88. Peter M. Shane, The Rule of Law and the Inevitability of Discretion, 36 
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 21, 24 (2013).  
89. Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power 
Threatens American Democracy 116 (2009). 
